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Abstract: Sociology was born as a discipline that analyzed the process of modernization of Western
European societies. However, in turn, this science was developing a predictive, prophetic vision
of the future of human communities, assuming that they were all going to follow paths similar to
those followed by Western Europeans. This prophetic dimension reduced the capacity of sociology to
analyze new phenomena including, on the one hand, phenomena relating to other societies, on the
one hand, but also, on the other hand, phenomena related to the transformations suffered by Western
European societies after their process of modernization. This last case constitutes the objective of this
work, in which I try to recover the purely analytical character of sociology. To this end, I intend to
relate the general model of the political modernization of Western European societies elaborated by
historical sociology to the theory of social differentiation, avoiding the evolutionary drift of this theory.
From that position, I try to specify the analytical nature of some conceptual instruments of sociology,
in order to make them more useful to understanding the contemporary social transformations of
Western European societies. Some of these transformations have changed the tendency towards the
cultural homogenization characteristic of modernization, because after the two world wars these
societies began to receive strong flows of immigration.
Keywords: religion; culture; politics; differentiation; historical process; Western European countries
1. Introduction
Sociology as a science was born out of the undertaking to analyse the process of transformation
that led Western European countries to become modern societies during the 19th and 20th centuries.
Sociology analysed and theorised this process of transformation. The analysis of this process carried
several assumptions that need to be highlighted to understand the great transformations that are
taking place today. Sociology as a discipline has exceeded the limits of its analysis of specific historical
realities. It became a predictive machinery of the processes that other realities would necessarily
undergo in the future. It exceeded its own analytical character and contributed to forming an idea
of what the world in general would come to be. Sociologists forgot the historical character of social
reality and the historical character of their concepts and analytical instruments.
A sociology of sociology allows us to examine its birth and realise that this science was not only
an instrument of knowledge, but also a political instrument. For Albrow (1997, p. 200), one of the
characteristics of the project of modernity was that the state was its fundamental agency. This involved
very high doses of reflexivity and a certain predictability of the process. It can be said that sociology
was one of the elements that contributed to providing a reflexive1 character to this political project:
1 Sociology helped, no doubt, to think about the social consequences of political decisions.
Religions 2018, 9, 144; doi:10.3390/rel9050144 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions
Religions 2018, 9, 144 2 of 13
the construction of the state’s internal architecture and a society as a culturally homogeneous social
reality within the state’s territory.
We are currently living in a period in which the modernizing phase of Western Europe has ended
and in which other countries have developed economically along paths very different from those
followed by Western countries. In this work, I try to provide some keys to the rescue of sociology’s
exclusively analytical character, in order to contribute to the analysis of contemporary social reality.
Within social science, two strategies have been proposed to elaborate this analytical rescue of classical
concepts and theories: the genetics of concepts (Swidler 1986; Asad 2003) and historical sociology
(Casanova 2006).
In a recent work (Pérez-Agote 2014), I tried to rescue the analytical potential of a part of the theory
of modernization that had proved ineffective in its predictive task of the future of some non-Western
countries: the theory of secularization. In the present article I want to rescue another theory, that
of social differentiation, and for that I use the following strategy: historical sociology2. Therefore,
the fundamental content of this article is an examination of the process of separation between culture,
religion, and politics that culminated in the modernity of Western European societies, and by the
postmodern transformation of these differentiations.
In order to understand the processes of the more or less successful formation of the modern
(democratic and national) Western European states, I propose to carry out an integration, with an
analytical purpose, of the theory of social differentiation in the design of the aforementioned processes
developed by historical sociology. In fact, the historical sociology of Tilly (1990) constructs a general
model from which differences in concrete cases with respect to the model can be observed. Thus the
differences become significant for the understanding of each concrete process.
“The most dramatic expansion of nonmilitary state activity began ( . . . ) after 1850 or so. In that
period, which extends to the recent past, military organization moved from a dominant ( . . . )
segment of state structure to a more subordinated position as the largest of several differentiated
departments under control of a predominantly civilian administration. (That subordination
was, of course, greater in peace than in war, greater in Holland than in Spain.) ( . . . )
European states began to monitor industrial conflict and working conditions, install and
regulate national systems of education, organize aid to the poor and disabled, build and
maintain communication lines, impose tariffs for the benefit of home industries, and the
thousand other activities European now take for granted as attributes of state power. ( . . . )
Internally, states undertook to impose national languages, national educational systems,
national military service, and much more. Externally, they began to control movement
across frontiers, to use tariffs and customs as instruments of economic policy, and to treat
foreigners as distinctive kinds of people deserving limited rights and close surveillance.
As states invested not only in war and public services but also in economic infrastructure,
their economies came to have distinctive characteristics, which once again differentiated the
experiences of living in adjacent states.
To that degree, life homogenized within states and heterogenized among states.” (Tilly 1990,
pp. 114–16)
The modern process of the cultural homogenization of the population takes place, firstly, with regard to
the ethnic diversity of the population living within the state’s territory. The national education system,
the communications network, and compulsory military service became, among others, important
2 In the present article, the revision based on historical sociology is more direct. If in this text I wanted to discuss central
concepts, such as those of religion or culture, another strategy would have been very relevant.
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mechanisms of extension of the national culture and language. Historical sociology shows us the
process of construction of the European system of states (Tilly 1990, pp. 161–91). In most of them, their
objective elements were formed first. Power over a physically defined territory was concentrated in a
political centre, and that centre had exclusive access to the means of violence; territory and a centre
of power are the state’s elements that have an objective character. Having obtained this objective
character, the state exists. The state’s subjective dimension has to do with its legitimacy and, in the
long term, its outcome through stability.
Regarding the state’s subjective dimension, according to Weber (1978, p. 1057), we can say that
the legitimacy of power is not an intrinsic characteristic of a power, but refers to the generalised
psychological disposition of the acceptance of this power by the population; legitimacy refers to the
“reasons for internal justification”. The social symbolic element, according to which the population
accepts power, has changed historically. Tradition, religion, the legitimate capacity of a leader to rise
up against a power are seen as unfair. In the historical moments during which the state’s objective
elements were definitively established, religion was an essential element that legitimised power that
extended to populations with different traditions and cultures. Religious homogenization thus became
relevant; this is how the application of the principle cuius regio eius religio at a given historical moment
was fundamental, as we will later see. Later, the idea of the divine right of kings would prevail to justify
their absolute power. However, at the time that sociology began, the legitimacy of power is already
changing radically; the origin of power over people does not reside in God or the king, as God’s
representative, but in the people themselves, the nation.
Modern nations have been constructed in a different way to that explained by their official
history. Their origins are not lost in the mists of time, in the dark ages described by
the first chapters of national histories. Neither is the slow constitution of territories in
random conquests and alliances the genesis of nations: it is rather the boisterous histories of
principalities and kingdoms. The truthful birth of a nation is when a handful of individuals
declare that the nation exists and start trying to prove it. The first examples go back no
earlier than the 18th Century. Before that, there is no nation in the modern meaning, that
is, political. This idea falls within an ideological revolution. The nation is conceived as a
broad community, bound together by ties other than being subject to the same sovereign or
belonging to the same religion (...). The entire process of identity construction consists in
determining the assets of each nation, in disseminating its cult. (Thiesse 1999, pp. 11–12)
Monarchies had to be overthrown or subjected to the nation’s political control. Churches had
to be removed from the political sphere; their monopoly over truth and the ethical evaluation of the
world had to be replaced by the will of people, generally expressed in the law.
History, sociology and the arts became the creating force of the new collective culture and identity.
The educational system, especially public schools, was the great disseminator. Historians carried out
the task of explaining the history of the construction of the state as the history of the nation, as if
the latter were previous and had finally managed at that moment in history to provide itself with a
differentiated political structure. Nietzsche was well aware of the role of history in the construction
of myths; for him, the purpose of knowledge resided in the destruction of such myths that feed
man. As Foucault states, for Nietzsche, history is effective, that is, a destroyer of myths, as long as
it introduces discontinuity inside our being; at the beginning of a history there is not an original,
preserved identity, but the discord of the other things (Foucault 1992). However, a nation’s history
is usually taught as sacred history, and idolized to prevent the mental manipulation of our origins,
which are arbitrary or, as Nietzsche would say, are the discord of the other things, namely folly
and conflict. The legitimating function of history consists in affirming the existence of the nation
from the beginning, although is only a product, a historical result. According to this, the nation has
existed since the beginning, and through democratic modernity it manages to provide itself with
a representative political structure. Nevertheless, the nation is a modern historical product. The
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successful or less successful dissemination of this idea of the nation will result in the emergence or
resurgence of peripheral nationalisms, of collectives that launch the idea of another nation against that
state. For these reasons, Nisbet has been able to clearly state that “the nation is the offspring of the state”
(Nisbet 1973, p. 164)3. This is, broadly speaking, the ideal model of state built in the modernisation
of Western Europe—the democratic national State. The nation did not exist, the state had to build it
through various social mechanisms, such as the national educational system that transformed illiterates
in their mother tongue into persons literate in the national language, foreign wars, and compulsory
military service.
The process of the historical construction of these types of states cannot be understood without a
process of industrialization that involves systematically applying all the scientific and technological
achievements to factory production. This implied the emergence of a new social sector, which was the
first national class in history (Marx 1972, p. 71). From the private sphere, this new sector gradually
developed a new public sphere before the king’s public political sphere. To this end, a series of specific
social mechanisms were gradually established (salons, cafés, newspapers and political parties) through
which a new way of thinking about social reality was gradually developing (Habermas 1981). This is
how the idea of society emerges as a complementary but substantive element; the idea that politics
has a social reality called society as its object. For the first time, politics is thought of as the exercise of
the king’s patrimonial power. It is the beginning of how in this modern time we think about and try to
regulate the social reality. Not all social reality constitutes a society in a strict sense. This social form
has not existed forever. As Albrow (1997) realised, this implies a political project, making it necessary
to conquer the state; this was the democratisation of the state.
Empirical reality shows us that the elements that conform to the ideal model are gradually
achieved at different historical times and even in a different order in different States; the degree of
achievement of each element may also vary. It is clear that in the prototypical model that I announced,
the construction of a state’s borders was not carried out following cultural and linguistic homogeneity
criteria. The borders were rather the historical result of wars, peace treaties, and marriages. This is
why the accumulation of military power within the territory was a core process to reach domestic
peace and prevent the penetration of a foreign power. Logically, the result of this process is a closed
territory with internal cultural and language diversity. The process of democratisation of this state in
subsequent moments in history required the dissemination of a common culture and a single language
within its borders, that which we have come to call the national language and culture. This process of
state nationalisation, of the general dissemination of the idea of the nation, of the idea of a common
national history, the genesis of a sentiment of common belonging to a social entity that originally
holds the power, is a process that needs the state to put into operation several of the aforementioned
social mechanisms.
First, I will review the different forms of differentiation that are typical of the process of
modernization of Western European societies. Then I will try to show how the strong immigration
processes that took place after the two world wars have put some of these forms of differentiation
into crisis.
2. Social Differentiation
In a recent work (Pérez-Agote 2016) I showed how to carry out the theoretical integration of
historical sociology and social differentiation theory. For this I used several interesting proposals. One
of them was "the brilliant re-examination of the theory of differentiation itself from a highly analytical
and empirical approach in the compilation of Alexander and Colomy (1990). This book contains
3 The two European exceptions where the national idea was prior to their unification, Germany and Italy, would very likely
not have been possible without a European context marked by the construction of the idea that a state’s population was its
nation; and by the state’s dissemination of the national idea and sentiment throughout the territory.
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evidence of the important influence of certain historicising chapters in Geertz’s “The Interpretation of
Cultures” (Geertz 1973), such as the work by Alexander (1990) on the historical ethnic formation of
American society.
From my point of view, the sociological theory of social differentiation, as part of the
modernisation theory, has suffered two forms of stultification. The first can be represented by Parsons’
work and especially The Social System (Parsons 1951), an attempt to describe the set of differentiated
structures integrated in a given society that define its operation. The second form of stultification
would be to consider such a theory to describe the future processes of change of societies. Luhmann
would be a good example of this tendency, as for him “the description of contemporary society as
highly differentiated forms was the hinge that mediated past and future.” (Luhmann 1990, p. 413)4.
However, I think that the development of Luhmann’s theory is useful to construct a more
analytical form of the theory of social differentiation itself. The fundamental reason behind this
attempt is that both forms of stultification participate in a prophetic vision of modernity, as if a social
form and the process to access it were prefixed for any future society. What I retain here is that the
general theory of modernisation, and within it the theory of social differentiation, have been a valuable
way of analysing historical social processes in some specific societies, rather than a way of predicting
the process (one could say progress) of any society in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to recover
the theory’s analytical side, both to analyse what occurs in other societies and to try and find out what
is happening in those societies that were analysed using the theory of modernisation after what we call
the global era. At present, we find that some non-western societies have accessed forms of economic
development very comparable to those of western countries without, at least yet, developing similar
social and political forms (Pérez-Agote 2014, pp. 890–91). Moreover, in the new era certain aspects that
used to define modern western countries have specifically disappeared; for example, in some countries,
the progressive cultural homogeneity—derived from the progressive diffusion of national identities
and cultures began to enter into crisis with the immigration flow after the two world wars. In addition,
we can observe the increasingly extensive dissemination of modern values in societies that have not
undergone similar processes to those followed by Western European countries; let us remember the
interpenetration of symbolic aspects in societies with different economic levels and different types of
political organisation. In a recent article about the new political trends of Spanish youth, I highlighted
this phenomenon when talking about the factors that gave rise to the indignants’ movement of this
decade. The final factor was global and epidemic, namely “the Arab Spring, a series of movements
of political protest that started in Tunis on 17 December, 2010. The events in the Arab countries,
and later in other countries with different socio-political situations, contained however, a series of
common features. The social sector motor of each movement consisted of young educated people
with difficulties integrating into the labour market, the core objective was to obtain or to improve
a representative democracy that resolved the people’s problems, new communication technologies
were used, a significant square was occupied in a big city, and finally, there was concern for horizontal
relations, not emanating from a centre of power.” (Pérez-Agote 2017, p. 106).
Luhmann alleges that four processes have proven efficient in social evolution: segmentary
difference (equality of subsystems), the centre–periphery difference, stratificatory difference (rank
inequality amongst subsystems) and functional difference (role inequality, rank equality). Luhmann
sees segmentary difference as the first differentiation yet still egalitarian; later, social reality would
evolve from equality to inequality, until reaching greater difference when the unity of the system
is reached through a system of differentiation (Luhmann 1990, pp. 423–25), which is equivalent
4 In my view, the theory of social differentiation in general suffers from three sources of weakness. One, adopting an
evolutionary dimension weakens its analytical plasticity. Two, its avoidance of the relations among the separated spheres,
because these relations are very relevant for the study of the processes of change. And three, when the theory of
differentiation does not appear in direct relation to the processes and levels of institutionalization of each sphere. However,
these issues are too extensive to be developed in this article.
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to saying, through labour division. Luhmann (1977) devoted one of his works to the theoretical
integration of systems theory and the theory of evolution. This is a good example of the evolutionist
and universalising character of differentiation theory. As a solid example of universalization, see
number 1964 of the American Sociological Review. In it, Parsons (1964) published Evolutionary
Universals in Sociology, and under this umbrella two articles were published, namely Bellah (1964),
Religious Evolution and Eisenstadt (1964), Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution. An interesting
aspect of the evolutionary view was highlighted by Voegelin (1956), as he claimed that societies
evolve from compact symbolic forms into differentiated forms, a concept utilized later by Bellah in the
aforementioned article. Voegelin’s idea is highly interesting for the understanding of the process of
modernisation of Western European countries, namely that expressing criticism of its universalising
and evolutionary character by no means involves underappreciating its analytical value and capacity.
Disassembling this universalising tendency started with the interesting idea that no matter how
differentiated a society is, there are times where there is a re-enchantment, a religious moment of
fusion or a political revolution. Edward Tiryakian (1985, 1994, 2009) is one of the great constructors of
the theory of these processes of de-differentiation, anticipating thus the return to mechanical solidarity.
Other interesting ideas to criticize the evolutionary and universalising vision of social differentiation
can be found in the cited work by Alexander and Colomy, which groups together works about the
de-universalization of the differentiation theory. These authors express in the preface: “Whereas the
initial formulation of differentiation theory rested upon the identification of a master trend of change
toward a greater institutional specialization, the current volume supplements the master trend with
the backlash movements against differentiation. ( . . . ) The benign assessment of the consequences of
differentiation, which stress adaptative upgrading and greater efficiency, is balanced by the recognition
that differentiation often generates discontents.” (Alexander and Colomy 1990, p. xiii)
3. The State as Differentiation
In terms of the theory of differentiation, the historical construction of the state’s objective elements
(centre of power with the monopoly on violence and a territory with fixed boundaries) is the process of
differentiation of a social reality with respect to its social context. In the case of Western Europe, it is
the clear differentiation of each state with regard to the adjacent states. This implies at the same time
another process of differentiation that takes place within the state’s territory, that of a centre of power on
the periphery; that is, a process of power centralisation within the territory. The great transformation of
the military made it possible to create an army capable of imposing the internal monopoly on violence
(internal peace) and preventing external forces from taking internal action (Tilly 1990, chp. 3).
Historically, the Christian religion had totally spread among the Western European population.
The ultimate foundation of the legitimacy of the general state of affairs and power in particular was still
in God, within the religious symbolic universe controlled by the church, until the Reformation. In the
16th century, with the “doctrine of free examination” (God speaks directly to the people) the Protestant
Reformation marked the beginning of the legitimate possibility for each person to think, although still
within a religious symbolic universe. It also involved the inversion of the existing hierarchy between
the sacred and the profane reality. All of this was a necessary condition for the free development of
reason and science that would be a core element of the future European modernity.
However, this religious subversion produced by the church from within gave rise to a deep
internal division of the political landscape from a religious point of view. The different dynasties, noble
houses and religious affirmations produced very dramatic consequences due to the maladjustment
between religion and politics in the different European territories. Thus, the old principle cuius regio
eius religio had to be applied after the Reformation in order to produce the religious unification of the
population under the sovereign’s religion. The law of internal cultural homogenization of Western
European states (Tilly 1990) was thus being fulfilled within the religious arena, although in some states
more deeply than in others.
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The Peace of Westphalia (1648) was a key moment in the foundational process of the European
system of states. In terms of differentiation, each state was established in its objective elements, that is
each state was differentiated from the other states around it. This foundational moment took place
because there was military power accumulated by a king who could thus maintain internal peace
(defeating other possible military powers) and defend the borders. Tilly (1990, pp. 103–7) explains
very well the importance of the changes in the military sphere for the king to accumulate power within
the territory. At these early stages, the state was essentially the army. With the separation between
state and the surroundings, there was also been in internal differentiation, namely the clear separation
between the king and the rest of the population inhabiting the state’s closed territory.
In this process of concentration of military–political power in the king, the court’s genesis has
a central position as a concentration mechanism. In The Court Society, Norbert Elias (1982) perfectly
describes the mechanisms by which European monarchs took the power of the nobles. Nobles
gradually lost power in terms of territorial possessions and gradually acquire power in terms of their
degree of closeness to the king and the court. The king was the political public sphere and his dominion
over the kingdom was patrimonial. The subjects existed but nobody saw them as a political unit.
4. The Differentiation of the Civil Society from the State
In the process of democratization and nationalization following the creation of the state, the idea
of the nation as the collective identity where power resides was needed to replace the idea of the
kings’ divine right. This is the stage when the state needed to become autonomous from religion and
the church, as the fundamental idea was now that power does not come from God, it belongs in the
community, the people and the nation. The idea of secularism was at the core of this question.
In the second half of the 18th century and at the beginning of the 19th century, the world sees what
Tiryakian (1989, pp. 143–49) came to call the first wave of nationalism, which took place in nation-states
in Europe and in the United States of America5. A process started where the national history, culture
and language were constructed and spread based on some existing cultural elements. This meant
implementing several standardising mechanisms within the State, that is, the new national culture.
Habermas (1981) showed the historical emergence of the possibility of a thinking society. From a
private sphere of life, a series of social groups progressively think about the public and society and
about the progressive replacement of an absolute order, where the public sphere was the court, by a
bourgeois order in which society conveys itself and criticizes the politics of power.
Thus, the public sphere ceases to be something simple and becomes something complex, formed
by the public sphere of political power, and the public sphere generated by the civil society from the
private sphere. For this to happen, a series of social mechanisms emerged through which certain
social sectors conceived this idea of society as the target of politics. After that, the hierarchical order
of the two spheres would gradually reverse until reaching the idea that the power resides in the
people, or national sovereignty. Following differentiation theory, the totalization of society is a political
operation. When society is thought of as a totality, the object of politics, the political sphere is thought
of as representing society. Voegelin (1968) is right, politics generates this totality that sociologists have
come to name society.
Habermas describes very well how the mechanisms that gave rise to a structure of communication
between the public sphere and civil society, between representatives and the represented, emerged
from the private sphere. First, there were the salons, which were generally managed by women from
high society and frequented by certain cultured sectors of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, where
5 Tiryakian includes within this first wave the late European cases, in which the nationalist dimension precedes the unification
of the state territory. These late cases constitute what Habermas calls the second European generation of nations, as we shall
see shortly. The second wave defined by Tiryakian refers to the third world nationalisms that emerged in the old colonial
empires; and the third is the one that refers to the peripheral nationalisms that have arisen in the interior of the western
states of the first wave: Basque Country, Scotland, Catalonia, Québec, etc.
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literary criticism was frequently changed into political criticism. Then the cafés experienced a similar
transition from literary to political matters. Not forgetting secret societies, later the periodical press and
finally the political parties became core social channels of communication. (Habermas 1981, chp. 2).
Habermas, outlines two generations of nations within Western Europe. The first generation,
corresponding to Northern and Western Europe, consists of the nations that emerged within previously
established territorial states. The nation in this case would be, in Nisbet’s words “the state’s offspring”
(Nisbet 1973, p. 164). The second generation would consist of Germany and Italy; these were nations
in search of a state (Habermas 1999, p. 81). In the more general case, where the state existed prior to
the national community (the pattern I utilised to talk about the process of modernisation), one of the
basic tasks was the cultural homogenization of all the ethnic groups within the state territory; this is
state nationalization and the constitution of a nation (Pérez-Agote 2006, chp. 2).
5. The Differentiation of Church and State
The separation between the national state as an institution and the predominant church within
the state’s territory was carried out in the different countries following different strategies, resulting
in very diverse forms of differentiation. Let us think about France, England, Spain6, etc. Different
models, different speeds, absolute radicality in the fight among institutions or a total lack of it, but
always leading to the secularisation of the legitimacy of political power, so that power came to reside
in the national community.
The separation between church and state was central from the first moment of the secularization
process. It was a difficult and long process, and it can be said that in general it was more dramatic
in Catholic countries, since where the Protestant Reformation triumphed, the church started to have
less direct control over social life, largely due to the doctrine of free examination having reduced the
role of this institution as the administrator of the truth. This played an important role in the free
development of science, but it also meant the loss of social and political power for the reformed
churches; in comparison, the Catholic Church held more power in the countries where it was the
dominant religion (Merton 1968, pp. 591–603, 628–60).
6. The Differentiation between Religion and Culture
In addition, during the construction and, above all, the democratization and nationalization
of the Western European states, another less dramatic and less politically transcendent process of
differentiation was taking place in the Western world. This was the process of differentiation between
religion and culture. This was a slow, complicated and less visible and less relevant process from
the political point of view than the separation between the church and the state. It was not so much
about a differentiation between institutions, as a differentiation between spheres; a differentiation
between a deeply institutionalized symbolic sphere in the Western countries, the religious sphere,
and culture, which was then, as now, a very weakly institutionalised sphere. When culture detaches
itself from religion, no specific institution emerges for its maintenance and control. I am not going to
delve into a definition of culture, doubtlessly one of the most discussed issues in the social sciences.
Using the term culture in a flat sense, with the meaning shared by the population, I just want to
6 The case of Spain, for instance, exemplifies how the described model is ideal. Well into the 20th century, the Spanish state has a
monarchy that still thinks of itself as absolute, and is seen as such by a strong landowning aristocracy and a high Catholic
hierarchy of pseudo-civil servants at the service of the monarchy. The industrial and financial bourgeoisies emerge in two
peripheral areas with regard to that central state. The left-wing forces and the new modernising bourgeoisie achieve the
democratic establishment of a republic; however, the forces that held the old core of power rose militarily against it in the
1936-1939 Spanish Civil War. After the war, General Franco’s dictatorship was installed, which came to be defined by historians
as Nationalcatholicism. Spanish bishops talked about the war as a crusade. Franco died in 1975 and the 1978 democratic regime
was established. In spite of happening so late (starting in the 1960s) the process of subjective secularisation of the population
has been the hastiest and deepest in the whole of Europe (Pérez-Agote 2014). However, Spanish democracy still vastly funds
private religious education (Pérez-Agote 2012a, 2012b; Dobbelaere and Pérez-Agote 2015).
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point out the fact that there is no specific institution for the general control of culture, in charge of
appointing what is orthodox and which sanctions heterodoxy in a negative way (like the church does
in the religious field) or a positive way (as sometimes, not always, happens in the field of science).
Culture in general is maintained by its use by actors and changes because other cultural forms gain
prestige and normality. Of course there are many types of controls and negative or positive sanctions
on repetition and innovation, but it is also clear that these sanctions are not in the hands of a unique
differentiated institution.
In the different European countries, a separation between religion and culture has taken place
historically, in which culture first detached itself from the church’s tutorship, and then from its
conformation. Religion is gradually losing influence in different social spheres, namely the political
and cultural spheres in which we are interested. Since the main support of culture, in the sense I
am using here, is its use by social actors, the process of individual secularization has been a central
dimension of this process of the separation of spheres. Danièle Hervieu-Léger mentions an initial period
of “décatholicisation” of the French population, in which France changed from being a religiously Catholic
country to being a culturally Catholic country, through the continued decrease of religious practice and
belief. The church’s capacity to control the behaviour of actors is equally decreasing. However, for a long
time religion has played an important role with regard to culture, becoming one of its fundamental roots.
Later, however, in a process that has come to be called “exculturation”7, culture is losing its religious
roots and is incorporating other sources like science and politics. (Hervieu-Léger 2003, pp. 90–98).
Nevertheless, this long historical process of Western European societies, in which there has been
a separation of culture and religion, with the latter withdrawing from the private and even intimate
sphere, has been deeply altered today. The separation between culture, religion and politics is being
deeply revised.
7. The Contemporary Crisis of Cultural and Religious Homogeneity
It is logical to think of a certain internal religious homogenization before Westphalia, especially in
those states whose objective elements were well defined much earlier, like Spain8. However, in general,
the establishment of a clear centre of power over a territory involves a relative cultural homogenization.
However, the historical period when this cultural homogeneity clearly becomes the stated political
goal is during the state nationalization period. The form of power legitimacy changes and people are
no longer subjects, but have become citizens.
A new stage of homogenization has begun as a function of the immigration flows that some
European societies started to receive after the First World War and especially after the Second World
War. This massive process began with emigration from the poor and overpopulated European countries
towards the industrialized countries of the Western European zone9; and then these western countries
began to receive migrants from their old colonies. After the wars, the industrialised countries needed a
larger workforce, so accommodating the immigrant population was relatively easy from an economic
labour point of view. For a long time, the social situation of the immigrant population was not
envisaged with the same acrimony as after the 1970s crisis, the so-called oil crisis, and the disturbance
it caused in the labour market. In the 1990s, the fall of the Iron Curtain opened up another strong
migration flow from Eastern to Western Europe.
7 I have used this concept to define the current third wave of secularization of the Spanish population (Pérez-Agote 2012a, chp. 4).
8 Spain unified its territory in 1492, with the conquest of Granada, under a unique centre of power, that of the Catholic
Monarchs. Moreover, the unification under this centre of power implied the religious homogenization of the population.
The decrees of expulsion for Jews and Moslems, on the one hand, and the concession of a special tribunal of the Inquisition
on the other, were the fundamental instruments to this end. However, the later national political homogenization was so
inefficient that in our days the acceptance of Spanish identity is still a problem among the population in various parts of
the state.
9 Spain: At the beginning of this century, several countries that, like Spain, had traditionally seen emigration until the 1970s
start to receive large-scale immigration from African, Latin American, and Eastern European countries.
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The attempts towards the absolute or relative homogenisation of immigrant populations made
by the different political models in different European countries have been a complete failure. This
became apparent towards the end of the 1970s and especially the 1980s. Second generation migrants,
after having passed through the national education system, try to enter the labor market and encounter
insurmountable difficulties that, in many cases, end in exclusion. The social conflicts of this young
generation did not take long to develop.
Since the 1970s crisis, a contrast has emerged between the weaknesses of the European labour
markets on the one hand, and the maintenance of structural conditions in countries with a tendency to
emigration, together with largely settled social networks to that end, on the other. This contrast has
led to two fundamental consequences in the field of international migration. The first is the restrictive
measures of the European governments, which has resulted in increased risks being undertaken by
people willing to emigrate and the growth of illegal immigration in receiving countries. The second
consequence is taking place within the new generations of immigrant populations settled in the
developed countries. The second generation are confronting a different situation from that of their
parents in relation to the main mechanisms of social integration. The public integration mechanisms
are the education system and the closely related labour market. No great general assumptions can
be made about the situation of the education system, but unless the labour market is in very good
health, these new generations will face problems integrating into society, acquiring a social identity and
developing positive self-esteem. Moreover, the quintessentially private social mechanism, the family,
is also in a problematic situation.
The French case, for example, is interesting. The first generation had an instrumental adaptive
behaviour, and therefore its members designed an adaptive strategy for the education of their children.
With the “oil crisis” of the 1970s, public integration mechanisms deteriorated. This had very strong
effects on some young sectors of the immigrant population, namely the appearance of conflicts
between young people and the receiving society, the search for a social identity and of new sources
of self-esteem given the difficulties encountered in joining the labour market, and the resulting
revaluation of their original language and culture. Sometimes, this last effect may in turn result in
making intergenerational relations ambivalent within the family. Their parents had given priority to
the language and culture of the receiving society and the younger generation turns their gaze to their
original society. The relationship between them becomes ambivalent as, on the one hand, they hold a
grudge towards their parents for having relegated their original language and culture, and on the other
hand they feel connected to them through ties of affection and because their parents represent precisely
their original language and culture. This type of phenomena makes us understand that, in general,
intrafamilar intergenerational relationships are very important to understanding the attitudes of young
people with respect to the receiving society. The difficulties in the labour integration of young people
cause them to look for other sources of social identity, self and social esteem, such as the original
culture and religion. Religion becomes an option rather than an inheritance.
For immigrants in general, religion offers a social benefit in terms of social refuge and a source
of identity, self-esteem and pragmatic solidarity. The less effective the public social mechanisms of
integration (education system, labour market and a good connection between them) the greater the
need to gain self and social esteem through their own resources. As Olivier Roy (2005) reminds us,
Islam is today a European religion. This in turn raises the problem evoked by Roy, namely the return
of these young people in France to an Islamic religion by choice (Tietze 2002), after having been
previously de-Arabized and de-Islamized by the republican school system, prior to their rejection by
the labour market. This return to a religion after being devoid of the general cultural coating it had for
previous generations, this de-cultured religion, is more prone to the letter than the spirit, and more
prone, therefore, to lead to fundamentalist proposals (Khosrokhavar 1994, pp. 130–31). It would thus
need to undergo a drastic, dramatic and traumatic process of functional differentiation, of separation
between the Islamic culture and religion.
Religions 2018, 9, 144 11 of 13
New migratory flows have led to the religious heterogenisation of our societies. Immigrant
populations have not—at least not to the same extent as in Europe—undergone a process of
differentiation of religion in relation to other spheres such as culture and politics. This difference in
the level of differentiation of religion has on many occasions been, and continues to be, a source of
socio-cultural conflict. We can recall the controversy over the Islamic veil in France and the Stasi report
of 2003, which recommends the prohibition in schools of “tenues et signes religieux” (Stasi 2003, p. 68).
The report’s only mention of the significance of the veil is that it may conceal “différentes significations.
Ce peut être un choix personnel ou au contraire une contrainte . . . .” (Stasi 2003, p. 57). It is evident
that the Stasi Commission reached its conclusions from a single viewpoint, that of the autochthonous
French population, which holds the veil to be a religious symbol. From a different cultural perspective,
according to which there is no clear separation between culture and religion, and where there is no
differentiated religion, the veil is a religious–cultural–family symbol, and on certain occasions can
also even be said to be political. The commission took an ethnocentric stance based on the belief that
France was a culturally homogeneous society, and by 2003 it clearly was not.
European democratic societies are no longer culturally homogeneous, yet they maintain a
dominant religious tradition, and the separation between Church and state can be approached
differently10. At the end of a recent work I concluded: “European societies have been relatively11
homogeneous from the religious point of view. Today however a sector of their population,
with immigrant origins but by now largely national, professes religious confessions other than the
historically dominant ones. For this segment religion plays an important role in the social integration
of the community ( . . . ); these religious groups also clearly need economic and political support
to conduct their religious activities. This is even more so when the labour market—a fundamental
mechanism for social integration—is becoming ever more disengaged from state control due to the
globalisation of the economy. Attention is beginning to focus on the issue of the separation of Church
and state, although still timidly in Europe for the time being” (Pérez-Agote 2016, p. 111).
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